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I. INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding the global proliferation of legal instruments protecting 
religious freedom and various academic and political projects investigating
and advocating for religious freedom today, I take it as an increasingly
urgent and open question whether a sufficiently stable account of religion 
can be produced to underwrite these projects, given the compromised
genealogy of the term and the wildly diverse social and cultural objects
that have been and might be termed religious. This absence is particularly
the case in the United States where, lacking a ministry of religious affairs
whose work it is to determine what does and does not count as religion for
legal and political purposes, the indeterminate presence of the word in the
federal and state constitutions—not to mention countless statutes and
administrative regulations—results in a kind of absurd lack of resolution.
* © 2014 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan.  Winnifred Fallers Sullivan is Professor and 
Chair in the Department of Religious Studies and Affiliated Professor of Law in the 
Maurer School of Law, Indiana University Bloomington.  This essay originated as an 
oral presentation for a conference titled, “Is Religion Outdated (as a Constitutional 
Category)?” hosted by the University of San Diego School of Law’s Institute for Law 


























     
 
  
      
    
 
 
   
    
The two most recent religion cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Wheaton College v. Burwell, 
considering the scope of religious exemptions to the Affordable Care
Act, only underline this state of affairs.1 
Among other things, confusion about the appropriate referent for legal 
uses of the word religion highlights the gap between legal, academic, 
and popular, accounts of religion.  Academic accounts increasingly take,
as a point of departure, the linked and blurred history of “religion,” whether
considered linguistically, historically, or phenomenologically, in relation
to what is termed secular.2  Popular accounts increasingly reflect the 
bottom-up DIY quality of US religion.  To grant rights to religion is not to
recognize, in a neutral fashion, an acknowledged social fact but to prefer 
one religious or secular politics over another.3 
Law professors commonly answer this critique by scholars of religion, 
as Andrew Koppelman does, with the comment that, after all, any ambiguity
in definition only arises in a few cases.4  Most of the time the reference
is obvious, he says.  Moreover, he insists, it has worked fine for all those 
for whom it should work.5  But that is the problem—its very obviousness. 
The problems of exclusion are largely invisible.  The reference is so obvious
to many and so obviously inclusive of those who are deserving that there
is no way to have a conversation about it without the conversation devolving
into a question about whether the activity seeking protection is socially 
valuable or not. For example, it is embarrassing to have the dissenters in
Hobby Lobby and Wheaton College protesting about how much they
respect religion and religious freedom while plainly suggesting that what 
the plaintiffs are doing in these cases is not, in fact, religion—or at least
not the right kind of religion.6  On what ground is that exclusion being
made? Where is it written that for-profit corporations and those who run 
them cannot have religious scruples?7  Why do we continue to have
confidence in our ability to make these distinctions? 
1. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Wheaton College 
v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
2. Among many others, two classics in this genre are TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF 
RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM (1993) and 
JONATHAN Z. SMITH, IMAGINING RELIGION: FROM BABYLON TO JONESTOWN (1988). See
also WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2005);
POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., forthcoming 2015). 
3. See ELIZABETH SHAKMAN HURD, BEYOND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE NEW GLOBAL 
POLITICS OF RELIGION (forthcoming 2015).
4. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 7, 45 (2013). 
5. See id. 
6. See, e.g., Wheaton College, 134 S. Ct. at 2815. 
7. See Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, SOC.
SCI. RES. COUNCIL IMMANENT FRAME BLOG (July 8, 2014, 12:33 PM), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif 
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II. RELIGION TODAY 
The question that framed the conference at which the papers collected
here were presented, “Is Religion Outdated (as a Constitutional Category)?,” 
can be understood descriptively or normatively.  In other words, it could 
be understood to have asked whether religion is outdated as a constitutional
category because our capacity to distinguish religion has become more
difficult than was previously the case, or it could have been understood 
to have asked whether, prudentially speaking, we should continue to make 
the effort, whether or not it has become more or less difficult, because of 
our acknowledgment today of the inevitability of discriminating both against 
those who do not identify as religious and against those who participate 
in disfavored religion—sometimes termed immorality, barbarism,
superstition, extremism, heresy, or though the use of a euphemism such
as culture or personal preference.8 
Descriptively speaking, there is a great deal of evidence that socially 
and culturally acknowledged religion in the United States today encompasses 
a much broader range of ideas, attitudes, and activities than was the case 
at the end of the eighteenth century when the First Amendment religion 
clauses were drafted. At that time, religion was used to denote mostly
protestant Christian practices, although there were occasional gestures 
beyond—to Catholics and occasionally to Jews and Mahometans. Today, as
a result of disestablishment, and as a result of fragmentation and change 
within Protestant churches, the invention of new religions, immigration, 
and inclusive efforts to recognize those practices that were present but 
mostly not recognized as religion at the end of eighteenth century—Native
American, slave, and folk religion—there is far greater diversity. There
is, further, a shift of religious authority away from institutions and leaders to
the people.  The stakes entailed in self-identifying as religious are shifting
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2014/07/08/impossibility-of-religious-freedom (reposted by Kristi
McGuire, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan on the Impossibility of Religious Freedom, U. CHI.
PRESS BLOG (July 8, 2014), http://pressblog.uchicago.edu/2014/07/08/winnifred-fallers-
sullivan-on-the-impossibility-of-religious-freedom.html and by Nicholas Eckhart, The 
Impossibility of Religious Freedom: Hobby Lobby, Wheaton College and the Challenge 
for Liberals, SALON (July 10, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.salon.com/2014/07/10/the 
impossibility_of_religious_freedom_hobby_lobby_wheaton_college_and_the_challenge_for
_liberals).
8. Also known as adiaphora, or things indifferent, in Christian theology.  See 
Jakob de Roover, Secular Law and the Realm of False Religion, in AFTER SECULAR LAW
43 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011). 
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as well. Many are self-identifying as spiritual but not religious in an
apparent attempt to distance themselves from what they see to be 
the tarnished legacy of “organized religion.”9  What we see today in the
United States is a riotously plural religious field, one that is bursting at
the seams and placing enormous burdens on the word.  Can law take 
account of these changes?
At Indiana University we recently hosted a conference on the fiftieth 
anniversary of the School District of Abington Township v. Schempp
decision, an anniversary that highlighted the lag time in adjusting our 
understanding of religion today.10  For lawyers and legal scholars, Schempp
is usually fit into a history of the constitutionality of bible reading in 
public schools.11  For many in religious studies, however, Schempp is taken 
to mark the licensing of religious studies as a field acceptable to public
universities.12 Dicta in the opinion is often used by religion scholars to 
support the notion that a division can and should be made between teaching 
religion and teaching about religion.13  Teaching about religion is understood
to be both constitutionally sanctioned and intellectually appropriate at a 
secular academy, while teaching religion is not.14  The division might seem
a bit naïve today in our post-secular moment—and indeed the best work
in the study of religion today does not observe the neatness of the Schempp
distinction—but the distinction echoes a separationism that is deep in the 
American psyche.  Notwithstanding the plentiful evidence that religion on
the ground does not look the way separationists on each side of the divide 
see it, the Schempp myth is persistent.  Not just in the defense of religious 
studies but also in other official discourses.  The religious-secular divide 
does a lot of work for a lot of people.  Why do we hang on to an outdated 
notion of religion? Some have suggested that our faith in religion belies 
a broader anxiety.
III. THE CHURCH 
In the introduction to his new book, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, 
Bruno Latour relates an encounter between French corporate executives 
9. WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, A MINISTRY OF PRESENCE: CHAPLAINCY, SPIRITUAL
CARE AND THE LAW (2014).
10. See Conference at Indiana Univ. Dep’t of Religious Studies: 50 Years After 
Schempp: History, Institutions, Theory (Sept. 27–29, 2013), http://indiana.edu/~relstud/news
/schempp.
11. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218–22 (1963). 
12. See Sarah Imhoff, The Creation Story, or How We Learned to Stop Worrying 
and Love Schempp, 83 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION (forthcoming 2015). 
13. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 306. 
14. Id. 
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and a climate scientist, suggesting a broad return to the institution across 
various domains: 
They’re sitting around a table, some fifteen French industrialists responsible 
for sustainable development in various companies, facing a professor of 
climatology, a researcher from the Collège de France.  It’s the fall of 2010; a 
battle is raging about whether the current climate disturbances are of human 
origin or not. One of the industrialists asks the professor a question I find a 
little cavalier: “But why should I believe you, any more than the others?”  I’m
astonished. Why does he put them on the same footing, as if it were a simple
difference of opinion between this climate specialist and those who are called
climate skeptics (with a certain abuse of the fine word “skeptic”)?15 
I wonder how the professor is going to respond.  Will he put the meddler in 
his place by reminding him that it’s not a matter of belief but of fact? . . . But 
no, to my great surprise, he responds, after a long drawn-out sigh: “If people 
don’t trust the institution of science, we’re in serious trouble.”16 
. . . It is a little as though, responding to a catechumen who doubts the 
existence of God, a priest were to sketch out the organizational chart of the 
Vatican, the bureaucratic history of the Councils, and the countless glosses on
treatises of canon law.17
 . . . . 
. . . Since Certainty had been commandeered by his enemies and the public
was beginning to ask rude questions; since there was a great risk that science
would be confused with opinion, he fell back on the means that seemed to be at
hand: trust in an institution . . . .18 
Latour evinces a similar return to the institution in Rejoicing, his very
personal account of his yearning for a church he once belonged to.19 
Rejoicing describes his memories of his experiences as a young Catholic,
the loss he feels today at no longer feeling at home in church, and the
sorrow he feels that his children will not know that feeling.  Religion, 
Latour suggests, without the institution of the church, like views on climate
change without the institution of science, threaten to devolve into individual 
opinion.20  As with the climate scientists, without institutions there is only
15. BRUNO LATOUR, AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE: AN ANTHROPOLOGY 
OF THE MODERNS 2 (Catherine Porter trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2013) (2012). 
16. Id. at 3. 
17. Id. at 4. 
18. Id. at 5. 
19. BRUNO LATOUR, REJOICING: OR THE TORMENTS OF RELIGIOUS SPEECH (Julie











    
 
 














the unwinnable individual conversations about belief—about evolution 
—about the age of the earth—about whether the Bible is true and God 
exists. 
Interestingly today, there is evidence that the Supreme Court, too, could 
be said to be moving back to institutions in defining religion for purposes of
the First Amendment.  It is very striking that the opinion of a unanimous 
Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
EEOC does not speak of the freedom of religion but of the freedom of 
“the church.”21  Speaking of the church, rather than of religion, enables the 
Court to avoid the question of whether or not God thinks Cheryl Perich
should lose her job.  It allows the Court to outsource questions of truth in
matters of religion—and to focus, as Latour suggests, on institutional
legitimacy and continuity.  The last sentence of the Court’s opinion in 
Hosanna-Tabor announces the dogma that binds the majority opinion.22 
Affirming for the first time the constitutional status of the ministerial
exception, the Chief Justice declares that, “The church must be free to 
choose those who will guide it on its way.”23 Not that persons must be 
free to choose their own ministers but that the church must be free.24 
What is the church?  Christians mean different things at different times
when they use the definite article in speaking of church—when they speak
of the church. Sometimes they are referring to the church on the corner 
or a particular church organization, such as the Presbyterian Church 
USA—one of any number of churches. That is how the Court uses the
phrase at various points in Hosanna-Tabor, such as when referring to 
Hosanna-Tabor in particular or when referring to the Church of England,
and so on.25  In academic and political contexts, the church may be opposed 
to “the state,” vaguely throwing a circle around all religiously motivated 
activity.  The Court in Hosanna-Tabor is not speaking in these ways in its
last sentence.  The Court is speaking theologically, and dogmatically, as 
it does several pages earlier in describing the purpose of the ministerial
exception: “The exception . . . ensures that the authority to select and control 
who will minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical’—is 
21. 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).  Hosanna-Tabor considered the constitutionality 
of the dismissal of a schoolteacher, Cheryl Perich, by a Missouri Synod Lutheran
elementary school in Michigan, found to be in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) by the EEOC.  See id. at 701.  The school defended, arguing that 
the ministerial exception was a defense to the charge.  Id.
22. Id. at 710. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. See, e.g., id. at 698, 702. 
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the church’s alone.”26  It is speaking the way the priest in Latour’s example 
is speaking. It is an appeal to apostolic authority. 
Theologically speaking, for Catholics, and many other Christians, the
church refers to what might be termed “the mystical church,” also known in
Christian doctrine as the “body of Christ,” that is, the communion of all 
Christian believers across space and time, alive and dead, unified through 
the Resurrection.  Christians have differed about how the visible church 
on earth should be governed and have related in different ways with 
political authorities. They also have different ways of describing the 
unity of Christianity. The Roman Catholic Church understands itself to
be a universal church, that is, as encompassing all Christians, both on 
heaven and on earth.  For the Orthodox as well, the church is one, while
manifested in different places.  Protestants have had a range of theological 
readings of the church, derived in part from their new readings of the 
New Testament beginning in the sixteenth century, a range that is reflected
in the range of ecclesiologies among American colonial proponents of
religious freedom.  But a distinguishing feature of the United States, 
arguably, is that after 1791, the unity of Christendom expressed as the 
church, whether in Roman Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant guise, no
longer had legal personality.  It was the people who were then in charge. 
Take Roger Williams, for example, the seventeenth-century founder 
of Rhode Island and hero to many a current religious defender of the 
rights of churches in the United States.  For Williams, the church was to
be found, if at all, in those local few “gathered in [Jesus Christ’s] name” 
without any bureaucratic superstructure.  At the end of his life, Roger 
Williams, skeptical of Christian claims of biblical authority to found churches 
and of the hypocrisies of what he derided as Christendom, belonged to no
church. Williams has many present-day successors. Many confessing
Christians today do not belong to or attend churches.  One could even argue
that it was Williams’ skepticism about organized religion rather than any 
desire to protect religious institutions that most presages constitutional 
religious disestablishment.  Williams, pious Christian though he was,
thought political life in a diverse community could be organized without
reference to religion—or to the church.27 
26. Id. at 709 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)). 
27. See THE LETTERS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 1632–1682: NOW FIRST COLLECTED 
(John Russell Bartlett ed., 1874). 
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The majority opinion in the Hosanna-Tabor case, affirming the
constitutional status of the ministerial exception as a right of the church, 
is supported by a curious mash-up of religious and political history.  The
villain of the piece is Henry VIII.  Before the Act of Supremacy, we are 
told by Chief Justice Roberts, the church in England had been free, at 
least since 1215, thanks to King John and the Magna Carta.  The church 
was free because King John had agreed that the church had the freedom 
of election to church offices.  According to the Court, Henry VIII interrupted 
that freedom with his break from Rome.  The church was then not free
again until the Puritans and Quakers arrived in the New World.  The 
freedom of the church, both in England during the time between King
John and King Henry and in the English colonies after 1607 but particularly
since ratification of the First Amendment, can be summed up, as the
Court describes it, in the capacity of the church to select its own ministers 
free of political interference.28  This same freedom did not belong to
individual members of the church. 
Profound differences in Roman Catholic, Reformation, and Anabaptist 
ecclesiologies and understandings of the freedom of Christians are finessed 
in this breezy historical account.  Slipping back and forth between “religious
organization,” “religious institution,” “religious group,” and “church,” as 
well as posing the relationship of each to an also hypostasized and
ahistorical “state,” the Court manages to avoid the enormously fraught
issue of what the church is and who speaks in its name at various times 
and in various places.  King John, Henry VIII, James Madison, and William 
Penn, members of very different churches, are all enlisted in this project
and apparently understood to be speaking of the same special freedom
for the church to select its own ministers. 
Church history stops for the Chief Justice in 1791.  After the truncated
account of English church history, what is most striking in his opinion is
the entire lack of acknowledgment of the remarkable changes to the churches 
—and to religion more generally—that occurred in the American colonies 
and in the new nation.  Disestablishment, division, revivalism, populism,
and immigration profoundly changed American religion.  After 1791, 
official Americans, when speaking of American religion, arguably can 
no longer descriptively—or, arguably, constitutionally—speak, as the Court
does, of the church and its rights.  The church had been disestablished. 
Precedent for the majority’s reading of the rights of the church is also
found in the church property cases.  This is a complex line of cases, but
one difficulty with using the church property cases as establishing the
right of the church to choose its ministers is that, by definition in such 
28. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702–03. 
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cases, there are at least two groups of people who lay claim to a right to 
define who is a minister and to choose their own minister.  In each case,
after the courts decided the issue, one group either did not get to select 
its own minister or had to abandon the church in question and found its 
own new congregation in order to do so.  In each case, the Court sided
with what it took to be the hierarchy. But the Court seems to see these 
cases as establishing the recognition of the rights of the church as an
institution. 
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor concludes this section of its decision 
with an announcement of the rule that “‘the First Amendment commits 
[resolution of the property cases] exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical 
tribunals’ of the Church.”29 Citing its decision in Serbian Eastern Orthodox 
Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, a dispute over 
control of the American-Canadian Diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church, 
the Court explains that the First Amendment “permits hierarchical religious
organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal 
discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes 
over these matters.”30 
Evidence for the Court’s transcendent ecclesiology, that is, its theory 
of the church and of church governance, can also be found in the way it 
distinguishes Smith. The Chief Justice explains that Smith is not controlling 
because the issue is not one of the right of religious individuals to a special 
exemption from neutral laws but of the right of the church itself: 
It is true that the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation, like Oregon’s prohibition
on peyote use, is a valid and neutral law of general applicability. But a church’s
selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote.  Smith 
involved government regulation of only outward physical acts.  The present
case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.31 
It is worth looking at this paragraph very closely.  What the Court says is 
that while the free exercise clause of the First Amendment provides no 
constitutional exemption from laws of general application for individual 
believers who engage in physical acts consistent with their religious 
beliefs—what many Christians term sacraments—the establishment clause
29. Id. at 705 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for United States and Can. v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720 (1976)). 
30. Id. (quoting Milivojevich, 426 U. S. at 724).















   
 
 














provides an exemption for the church from such laws because by interfering
with church governance the Court is interfering with “the faith and 
mission of the church itself.”32 
Here the Court speaks of the doctrinal priority of the church and 
presumably, therefore, of the legal privilege of its current earthly would-
be representatives. Acknowledging that the ADA would seem to be a 
law of general application from which religious actors would not be
exempt, Roberts explains that Smith concerned the constitutional status
of only outward physical acts.33  The Court here seems to be saying, as 
Douglas Laycock did at oral argument while representing Hosanna-Tabor,
that the church is prior to the sacraments because the church forms the
consciences of individuals.34  Preserving the hierarchical discipline and 
right to autonomy of the church is, the Court says, structural to the U.S.
Constitution, as evident in the priority which disestablishment (read as a 
rejection of Henry VIII’s rejection of the Pope in the Act of Supremacy
—a restoration to the freedom of the church granted by King John) has 
to free exercise in the ordering of the religion clauses in the First 
Amendment itself while acts performed in obedience to the religious
conscience of the individual must bow to secular law.35  By reading its 
version of church history into the First Amendment, the Court is enabled 
to give priority to the rights of the institutional church through its evocation 
of the church. But that history also enables a denial of rights to other 
Christians as well as to non-Christians. Freedom from hierarchical church
discipline arguably accorded to American Christians by the religion clauses 
is disregarded in favor of a strong assertion of the rights of the church.36 
There is arguably no analogy to the church outside Christianity. While 
other religious communities speak of the body of the faithful in various 
ways, the Court’s opinion would seem to suggest that its doctrine is tightly 
and very specifically bound to a specific and highly contested history of
the Christian church and its assertions of its rights in the context of a 
particular reading of English history.37  Founded in its understanding of
the English church, the constitutional right articulated by the unanimous 
Court in this decision is the “freedom of a religious organization to 
select its ministers.”38 
32. See id. 
33. See id. 
34. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55–56, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694. 
35. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702. 
36. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, “The Church,” SOC. SCI. RES. COUNCIL IMMANENT
FRAME BLOG (Jan. 31, 2012, 4:25 PM), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/01/31/the-church. 
37. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702. 
38. See id. at 705. 
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While the majority opinion acknowledges that it might occasionally
prove difficult to decide who qualifies as a minister for these purposes, it
nowhere mentions the difficulties of determining what a religious 
organization is.39  Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, displaying a careful 
concern for the Christian exclusivism of the majority opinion, begins the 
project of expanding the discussion beyond the church.40  “Minister,” Alito 
states, is a term that is mostly limited to the Protestant churches.  His
solution to this problem is to define minister functionally and universally, 
assuming that such a role can be found in all religious traditions—and
beyond.41 
Alito, with the EEOC, sees the rights of religious organizations with 
respect to ideological control of their members as similar to that of all
other voluntary associations, a right founded in the freedom of association 
expressed in the First Amendment, not in the rights of religion: “Religious
groups are the archetype of associations formed for expressive purposes,
and their fundamental rights surely include the freedom to choose who is 
qualified to serve as a voice for their faith.”42  This turn to the voluntariness
of American religious life corresponds much more closely to what
disestablished religion looks like in the United States today and to how 
most Americans understand their relationship to religious communities, 
that is, one not of top-down hierarchy but of bottom-up participation.  It
is also rooted in another reading of the history the majority tells, one that
tells a story of the freedom of Christians and eventually of non-Christians as
well. It is an understanding that sees Ms. Perich as the possessor of rights,
not the church.
IV. CONCLUSION 
Latour’s account of the conversation between the French industrialists 
and the climate scientists can help us, I think, to see why the Supreme
Court is anachronistically talking of the church today.  Lay opinion about
religion is too lacking in reliability to support exemptions, as Justice 
Scalia noted in Smith.43  It is also dangerously antinomian.
39. Id. at 707. 
40. See id. at 713–14 (Alito, J., concurring). 
41. See id. at 711–12. 
42. Id. at 713. 
43. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990). 
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The reappearance of the church in Hosanna-Tabor is the result, in 
part, of successful lobbying on the part of the church autonomy movement
in American law, whose potted history the Court has apparently adopted. 
But I think that the explanation for the recent resurgence of the church 
and other corporate forms of religion in the United States law, including 
in the various challenges to the Affordable Care Act, lies in part in a 
realization that the battle between religion and secularism is being 
reduced to the same question: Why should I believe you more than any 
of the others? Like the French climate scientist, United States religious
leaders have realized that their strength is in institutions, not in individuals.
One might see the decision in Hobby Lobby, recognizing corporations as 
enjoying the protection of RFRA, as another endorsement of institutional 
religion, albeit of a more unconventional kind.44 
Why does United States law continue to believe in the church when so 
few Americans do?  Most Americans are torn.  On the one hand, they
belong with the climate skeptics and the religious individualists, suspicious 
of ceding freedom to would-be elites. Yet most Americans also, like the
Court and the scientist, are worried about the risks of a dangerous decline of
authority.  The Court’s decisions could be said to reflect this ambivalence. 
Of course indeterminacy is also a characteristic of other constitutional 
words as well: speech, commerce, equal protection of the laws, and due
process. Is religion different?  I think so. For my part, I think religion 
presents a distinctive set of problems for law, for both historical and political
reasons. Religion and the history of religion haunt secular law.45  Liberal 
political orders define themselves in relation to a violent religious past.
For my own part, I think it would be better not to have laws in the United 
States that attempt to divide a set of people, objects, and activities that
are termed religious from a set of people, objects, and activities that are
not.  For any purpose.  Such distinctions are incoherent and discriminatory
under United States law, as countless opinions, statutes, and regulations 
attest. We do not know how to define religion, and the available evidence
suggests that we should probably stop trying.  Not because those practices 
that are gathered under the term religion are not important but because
the religiousness or not of a particular activity cannot be determined
44. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
45. See, e.g., HUSSEIN ALI AGRAMA, QUESTIONING SECULARISM: ISLAM, SOVEREIGNTY,
AND THE RULE OF LAW IN MODERN EGYPT (2012); DAVID M. ENGEL & JARUWAN ENGEL, 
TORT, CUSTOM, AND KARMA: GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THAILAND 
(2010); PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORY, LAW (1995); JANET 
JAKOBSEN & ANN PELLEGRINI, LOVE THE SIN: SEXUAL REGULATION AND THE LIMITS OF 
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE (2003); Benjamin L. Berger, Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture, 
45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 277 (2007). 
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with sufficient specificity and therefore should not matter in law.  We 
will have to find out collective reassurance elsewhere.
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